"Rechtsgut" as a Finnish Concept - Some Observations by Frände, Dan
“Rechtsgut” as a Finnish Concept -  Some Observations
A f Dan Frände1
Abstract
The article aims at explaining the discussion in Fin land on the concept “oikeus- 
hyva” originating from  the German concept o f “Rechtsgut”. The concept has 
nowadays a strong foothold in Finnish crim inal law. It is always necessary to de­
cide whether a proposal regarding redefinitions o f crim inal acts or crim inaliza­
tion o f new acts can be considered justified by an important public interest. This 
consideration can easily be referred back to the concept o f “Rechtsgut”. In addi­
tion, the concept is also used in the interpretation theory and the doctrine o f con­
currence o f offences.
1. Introduction
The Finnish translation o f Rechtsgut as a legal concept has its given place in 
Finnish crim inal law and crim inal procedural law. The concept is used in legisla­
tive works as well in case law. The concept is also included as a standard formu­
lation in crim inal legal doctrine in Finland. One could, perhaps, speak o f a con­
cept belonging to the general doctrines o f law (Tuori 2002 p. 169-173).
The translation o f Rechtsgut to “oikeushyva” has in Finland never been disput­
ed, even though other concepts, primarily the concept o f protected interests, have 
also been used during the last decade in translations o f the concept into Swedish.
I understand Rechtsgut as a general value or interest protected by a crim inal 
norm, either in force or a norm that is considered as needed.
Professor Brynolf Honkasalo attached primarily an interpretative function to 
Rechtsgut in his w idely read and cited book regarding general principles o f crim i­
nal law, published in its second edition in 1965. In order to interpret a norm o f 
criminal law, one must know the attached object o f protection, in other words the 
Rechtsgut (Honkasalo 1965 p. 141). In 1977 the report, which came to be the basis 
for the fu ll revision o f Finnish crim inal law, was published by the Crim inal Law  
Committee. In this report it is stated that Rechtsgiiter can be used when assessing 
the need for criminalization (K M  1976:72 p. 27). It is feasible to assume that the 
Committee, mainly consisting o f criminal legal researchers, was aware o f the 
German discussion concerning Rechtsgut, w ithin the frames o f which two notable 
works were published in the early 1970’s (Amelung 1972 and Hassemer 1973).
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It was, however, not before the end o f the 1980’s that the discussion regarding 
the so called system-critical Rechtsgutslehre reached a broader Finnish audience. 
In 1989 a text by W infried Hassemer, concerning symbolic crim inal law, was 
published in Finnish. The article stated clearly that the objective o f the concept is 
primarily not to systematize individual norms o f crim inal law, but to provide crit­
icism o f norms o f criminalization. The threat o f punishment can only be directed 
towards acts endangering Rechtsgiiter and, defined like this, the scope o f crim i­
nalization does not include for instance moral norms or values o f the society 
(Hassemer 1989 p. 396).
The 1990’s was a dynamic and exciting decade for the Finnish discussion on 
the concept o f Rechtsgut in relation to criminalization. In section two o f this 
presentation, I w ill attempt to give an account o f the results o f the developments 
at that time.
In order to avoid misconceptions, it should here be noted that it is the Consti­
tutional Law  Committee o f the Parliament that assesses the legitimacy and ac­
ceptability o f criminalizations. This organ works as a sort o f poor man’s constitu­
tional court and determines whether legislative proposals stand in conflict with 
the Constitution. Only i f  an A ct o f Parliament is in obvious conflict w ith the Con­
stitution can a court choose not to apply the act in question. After March 1st 2000 
and the entering into force o f the new Constitution this option has never been 
used by a Finnish crim inal court. Alleged conflicts with for instance the principle 
o f legality in section 8 o f the Constitution have been solved through interpreta­
tion, not by invalidation.
Section 3 o f this presentation focuses on situations where courts in their inter­
pretation o f law use arguments that more or less clearly belong to the doctrine o f 
Rechtsgut. Finnish crim inal law doctrine has since the 1990’s vivid ly discussed 
the so called teleological interpretation o f law. I w ill make no further references 
to this particular discussion, but I w ill in this presentation concentrate on the lines 
o f reasoning by the Supreme Court in cases where the concept o f Rechtsgut has 
been used.
In order to shed light on the usefulness o f the concept o f Rechtsgut two areas 
where the concept is used without any actual problematization w ill be presented. 
These questions concern, firstly, situations o f normative concurrence, and sec­
ondly, the determination o f the position as injured party (e.g. the victim).
After acquainting ourselves with Finnish crim inal law and crim inal procedural 
law, section 4 o f this presentation purports to summarize the state o f crim inal law 
in Finland. I w ill not, however, make any attempts to assess whether sim ilar ques-
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tions in other Nordic countries have been solved with the aid o f concepts corre­
sponding to the Finnish Rechtsgut.
2. The Boundries for legitime criminalization and “Rechtsgiiterschutz”
After the publication o f Hassemer’s article in 1989 it was not long before Claus 
Roxin ’s book from 1992 reached the Finnish forum o f crim inal legal research. In 
this book an attempt is made to link the doctrine o f Rechtsgut to the Constitution 
(Roxin 2002 p. 11). As Roxin states in an article from 2010 (Roxin 2010 p. 577) 
the German Constitutional Court has never so far declared a crim inal norm inva­
lid  on grounds o f absence o f links to an acceptable Rechtsgut. A  famous judg­
ment from 2008 with reasoning on Rechtsgut concerns the crime o f incest be­
tween siblings. The judgment includes a dissenting opinion by no one else than 
Hassemer, who at the time acted as a judge at named court (Asp 2009).
I am personally convinced that the German Rechtsgut discussion was o f im­
portance when Finland reformed its norms on fundamental rights and freedoms in 
the early 1990’s and in this context explicitly decided on the prerequisites for le­
gitimate criminalization. The preparatory works to this reform, entering into force 
in 1995 and which later came to be part o f the new Constitution, include the im­
portant report 25/1994 by the Constitutional Law  Committee. This report presents 
seven general prerequisites for restrictions o f constitutional rights through regular 
legislation. The possibility for restrictions does not, obviously, concern funda­
mental rights that are absolute in their nature or that have their own prerequisites 
for restrictions. The 1994 report does not explicitly consider the general role o f 
criminalizations. However, a report from 1997 (23/1997) took direct stands on 
also this question. This later report states explicitly that each crim inalization con­
nected to the exercise o f a fundamental right must be in conformity with above 
mentioned list o f seven prerequisites.
This demand for a clear link between fundamental rights and criminalizations 
can, nevertheless, be seen as automatically satisfied as a ll crim inalizations in­
clude threats o f warnings, fines or imprisonment. Especially as no crim inal norm 
includes only a warning o f punishment, one can easily state that all crim inal 
norms infringe the right to property or freedom o f possible perpetrators: these two 
rights are naturally protected by the Constitution. In addition, one could see 
threats o f punishment as constituting restrictions to the right o f freedom and self 
determination as all crim inalizations restrict the amount o f actions that can be un­
dertaken or neglected. The Finnish Constitution protects the rights and freedoms 
o f the individual, which is seen as a protection o f the right o f self-determination 
for the individual (Perusoikeudet 2011 p. 223). The conclusion is that in principle
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all crim inalizations must conform with the list o f seven prerequisites -  a conclu­
sion that is accepted also by the Finnish legal community.
An  interesting object for further analysis is whether this list o f seven prerequi­
sites says anything about the Rechtsgiiter, and if  so, whether any criteria for ac­
ceptable Rechtsgiiter are provided? O f the seven prerequisites on the list, two are 
o f special interest for our enquiry.
The first prerequisite o f interest is referred to by the Constitutional Law  
Committee as the demand for acceptability. The crim inalization must be based on 
weighty interests o f society and the concerned interest must be acceptable also 
from the point o f view o f the Constitution. This reasoning provides an opening 
for an interpretation linking the acceptable interest directly to the catalogue o f 
rights in the Constitution (and the European Convention o f Fundamental Rights 
and Freedoms) (Nuutila 1997 p. 41, Tolvanen 1999 p. 182, Viljanen 2001 p. 
333). I f this reasoning is accepted, one may easily in line with Viljanen (p. 143), 
view the link to a fundamental right as a clear indication o f that the crim inaliza­
tion is based on a weighty interest o f society. The model also has the advantage 
that the interest o f society in this manner can be given material content, as the 
content is extracted from the Constitution.
In the discussions in the Constitutional Law  Committee on new crim inaliza­
tions one can comparably easily find examples where the interest o f society has 
been linked to fundamental rights. In the report 21/2010 by the Constitutional 
Law  Committee, concerning restrictions to the law on tobacco, the Committee 
states that the suggested crim inalization promotes the health o f citizens. This in­
terest is explicitly mentioned in section 19 (3) o f the Constitution. In connection 
to the attempts to crim inalize the purchase o f sexual services in Finland the Con­
stitutional Law  Committee in its report 17/2006 states that the purchase o f sexual 
services violates the human dignity o f the seller as protected in section 1 (2) o f 
the Constitution. However, this proposal did not lead to legislative action to crim­
inalize the purchase o f sexual services on a general level due to political opposi­
tion in the Parliament.
A t the same time it is also clear that the Constitutional Law  Committee has 
accepted crim inalizations with the interest o f securing public order and security. 
Sometimes this interest can be linked back to the protection o f personal safety 
and security, but this is not always the case. Any mention o f such a link did not 
exist in the report 20/2002 o f the Constitutional Law  Committee regarding new 
legislation on public order.
Thus, the conclusion is that each weighty interest o f society can function as a 
ground for crim inalization regardless o f whether the interest can be linked to fun-
22
“Rechtsgut ” as a Finnish Concept -  Some Observations
damental rights or not. Looking more broadly at Finnish crim inal law, this be­
comes apparent: cruelty to animals, incitement to racial hatred, peijury, defama­
tion etc. cannot be linked to fundamental rights as they stand today.
So far it thus seems as if  the Constitutional Law  Committee through the de­
mand for a weighty interest o f society explicitly has tried to keep a distance to the 
concept o f Rechtsgut as it is developed and used in crim inal legal research. Much, 
however, implies that there has not been such intent by the Committee, particular­
ly as there at that time was no real “domestic”  crim inal legal theory o f crim inali­
zation. Such theory o f crim inalization was only developed with the doctoral dis­
sertation by Sakari Melander in 2008 (Nuotio 2010 p. 257-258).
Rather, the Constitutional Law  Committee most probably implies that the 
weighty interests o f society behind criminalizations can be referred to as Rechts­
gut. This conclusion stems from the second, for our survey interesting prerequi­
site for criminalization; the demand for proportionality. According to the Consti­
tutional Law  Committee this criteria refers to a consideration o f whether the 
crim inalization in question is necessary in order to protect the concerned Rechts­
gut (23/2007). It must also be considered whether there are other possible means 
for reaching the purpose -  the protection o f a particular Rechtsgut.
Hence, it is quite possible to refer to an interest o f society carrying such 
weight that it can form the basis for a crim inalization as a Rechtsgut. However, 
the Constitutional Law  Committee does not provide any direct possibilities to 
connect weighty interests o f society with the Constitution or any other normative 
source. The parallels to the case law o f the German Constitutional Court are ob­
vious here. There is, quite obviously, still a need for a Rechtsgutslehre where 
good reasons for crim inalization can be built and analyzed. Naturally, this dis­
course must be critical to its nature: W hich interests o f society cannot be lifted to 
the status o f a crim inal law Rechtsguf! As the Constitutional Law  Committee 
hears the opinions o f legal experts when deciding on matters o f compliance with 
the Constitution, also crim inal legal research plays an important role in the dis­
course; there is a direct line o f communication between law and practice.
3. Case law of the Supreme Court and the Concept of Rechtsgut
The Supreme Court has in its practice post 2002 used teleological interpretation. 
There is also another, more traditional method o f interpretation, but this other 
method w ill not be discussed in this context. It is not a simple task to find a suita­
ble name for the teleological method o f interpretation. As it reaches back to the 
reasoning o f the European Court o f Human Rights (ECtHR) it can, for our pur­
poses, be called the “EC-model” .
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The EC-model was, according to my understanding, launched by Supreme 
Court w ith the judgment 2002:11. Another representative judgment is the PAF- 
judgment 2005:27. The latter case concerned whether an enterprise from Åland 
promoting gambling services illegally had arranged gambling in mainland Fin ­
land as gambling services had been offered via the Internet. The Supreme Court 
took the view that illegal gambling had taken place and also stated that norms al­
ways must be interpreted. The Court then states that in case law it has been 
deemed necessary as well as justified to interpret the concepts used in norms o f 
criminalization, as long as the result o f the interpretation is in line with the pro­
tective intent o f the norm and the threat o f punishment, and as long as the result 
reasonably can be foreseen by the perpetrator (see for instance Supreme Court 
2002:11 and Supreme Court 2004:46).
This statement by the Supreme Court can be traced back to case-law o f the 
ECtHR. In the judgment S.W v U K  from 1995 the EC tHR states: “Article 7 ... 
cannot be read as outlawing ... interpretation from case to case, provided that the 
resultant development is consistent w ith the essence o f the offence and could rea­
sonably be foreseen.”
This seemingly simple phrase gives rise to a number o f highly interesting but 
utterly d ifficu lt questions. I w ill not attempt to answer them here. Rather, I am 
content with observing that the EC-method is not to be seen as a trump invalidat­
ing all other arguments. The Supreme Court uses the method in a controlled and 
restrictive manner. I f the interpretation supported by other more regular argu­
ments does not comply with the purpose o f the crim inal norm, this interpretation 
cannot be accepted. The charges must either be discarded, or another interpreta­
tion must be chosen. The same line o f thought is valid in relation to the demand 
for reasonable forseeability.
This interpretation naturally requires that the statement on the purpose o f a 
crim inal norm means the same as the violation o f a protected interest, the Rechts- 
gut. This interpretation does not assess whether a value is a weighty interest o f so­
ciety. Rather, the interpretation strives to find the reasons for the concerned crim i­
nalization. To me it seems as the Supreme Court in a consistent manner derives 
these protected interests from statements in preparatory works to the concerned 
crim inal law legislation. This is, however, not always the case and when such rea­
soning is impossible, the Court undertakes its own determination o f Rechtsgut.
A  very interesting development has taken place after the determination o f the 
prerequisites for constitutionally defendable crim inalizations by the Constitution­
al Law  Committee. It is now more or less legio for the Government to state the 
weighty interests o f society that make the crim inalization acceptable in a Gov-
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emment B ill. An  enlightening example is the Government B ill 330/2010 concern­
ing the crim inalization o f begging: A  proposition that did not at the time lead to 
legislative action. In the B ill it is clearly stated that the interest o f society is the 
preservation o f public order and safety (p. 23). I here assume that these weighty 
interests o f society are the same form o f interests as purported by the Supreme 
Court in its EC-model. The fact that the Supreme Court does not refer to 
Rechtgiiterschutz but rather to interests does not, to me, bring about any d ifficu l­
ties.
The concept o f Rechtsgut is used without further ado in instances o f concur­
ring norms and in situations o f determination o f the position as injured party. 
When two or more crim inal norms are applicable to the same action the presump­
tion is that the perpetrator shall be found guilty o f both crimes. This presumption 
can, however, be overthrown and the most important consideration in these situa­
tions concerns what could be referred to as “the dimension o f protected interests” . 
The basic idea is fairly simple: I f two crim inal norms at least partly protect the 
same Rechtsgut there is no reason to apply both norms. In this assessment the Su­
preme Court has used the concept o f Rechtsgut as well as the “ interest to protec­
tion” (for instance Supreme Court 2006:76, 2008:37 and 2009:73), however 
without being able to directly link these concepts to the statements in the prepara­
tory works. This lack is mostly due to the fact that the cases have concerned crim­
inal norms from a time before the Constitutional revision.
The concept o f Rechtsgut has most consistently been used in the context o f 
determining who is to be seen as an injured party in the Finnish crim inal proce­
dure. This position provides the party w ith a number o f procedural rights, among 
others the right to independently demand punishment. A  condition for being in 
the position o f injured party is that the person in question is in possession o f the 
Rechtsgut protected by the concerned norm that has been violated.
4. Conclusions
Rechtsgut as a concept gained a central position on the crim inal legal stage 
through the constitutional reform and the demands then made regarding legiti­
mate criminalizations. This position has been strengthened by courts and their 
frequent use o f the concept. Despite these developments, no consensus has been 
reached concerning what can be used as a Rechtsgut in crim inal law. However, as 
the legislator in preparatory works has included statements o f protected interests 
and as this has not met any resistance, there is at least one lead to the determina­
tion o f Rechtsgut in relation to particular crimes. A t the same time, nevertheless, 
courts in their interpretations o f law have the possibility to pick and choose be-
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tween weighty interests o f society referred to by preparatory works. Courts can 
decide to selectively use only one interest out o f many possible when determining 
the position o f parties in the procedure or in solving problems o f normative con­
flicts. There is, thus, no direct line between the statements o f weighty interests o f 
society in legislative preparatory works and the use o f Rechtsgut by courts in their 
reasoning.
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